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FLORIDA'S OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS: NO
EXCEPTIONS FOR ATTORNEY-CLIENT
COMMUNICATIONS
LUCILLE E.
I.

TURNER

INTRODUCTION

The Florida Supreme Court has recently clarified the previously
ambiguous relationship between two important public interests:
the public entity client's interest in confidentiality in its attorneyclient communications, and the public interest in principles of
open government. This Comment discusses those differing interests and explains how the court resolved the conflict between
them.
The attorney-client privilege has its roots in the common law
and has existed for hundreds of years. The reason generally given
for allowing the privilege is that confidential communication between an attorney and his client is necessary for the lawyer to prepare for litigation and for the client to receive effective legal advice.' The Florida legislature recognized the importance of the
privilege when it included a statutory attorney-client privilege in
the Florida Evidence Code that was adopted in 1976.2
The Florida legislature has also recognized the importance of
permitting the citizens of Florida to have access to the decisionmaking processes of state government. In order to promote such
public involvement, the legislature enacted the Public Records
Act 3 in 1909 and the Government in the Sunshine Law in 1967.
The effect of these open government laws has been to limit secrecy
in government by allowing the public to attend most official meetings and inspect most public records.
Both the attorney-client privilege and open government laws are
legislative expressions of important public policies. However, these
policies are in frequent conflict. While they promote access to government, open government laws have also made it difficult for public officials to seek legal advice in the course of conducting public
business. Normally, those types of communications would be made
confidentially and therefore would be privileged under the attorney-client privilege. This confidentiality may be important to pub1.
2.
3.
4.

C. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 502.1 (2d ed. 1984).
See FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1983).
Id. ch. 119.
Id. § 286.011.

390

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:389

lic officials, particularly in sensitive situations such as the discussion of pending litigation. Under the open government laws,
however, all of these communications would be subject to disclosure. The legislature has not been able to resolve the problem of
how to strike a proper balance between the two policies. Until the
recent pronouncements of the Florida Supreme Court on the subject, the courts also had a difficult time balancing the conflicting
interests. However, the Florida Supreme Court has resolved the
controversy in two recent cases which hold that the policies of
open government must prevail and that the attorney-client privi5
lege does not create exemptions from the open government laws.
Part I of this Comment examines the relationship between the
attorney-client privilege and the open government laws. Part II
sets out the laws in question and explains the public policies behind the laws. Part III examines the various ways that the courts
have tried to balance the policy considerations and how the courts
have tried to define the relationship between the open government
laws and the attorney-client privilege. Part IV reviews the effect of
the recent holdings of the Florida Supreme Court on the future of
open government laws and attorney-client relations of public entity clients.
II. AN
A.

OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT STATUTES

Florida's Statutory Attorney-Client Privilege

Florida's Evidence Code provides for a statutory attorney-client
privilege. In relevant part, the law states: "A client has a privilege
to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other person from disclosing, the contents of confidential communications when such other
person learned of the communications because they were made in
the rendition of legal services to the client."6 This privilege is
based on the common law attorney-client privilege. It is permitted
because courts have decided that the interests of justice require
that people seeking legal advice be able to talk freely to their attorney without fear of the consequences of disclosure. The United
States Supreme Court has said that the purpose of the attorneyclient privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to
their attorneys. Without the privilege, Justice White explained,
5. Neu v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 462 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1985); City of North Miami
v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 468 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1985).
6. FLA. STAT. § 90.502(2) (1983).
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"the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer
and it would
'7
be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice."
Florida courts have invoked similar policy considerations in support of the privilege. In Anderson v. State," the court said that the
policy behind the attorney-client privilege is to promote consultation with attorneys by removing the fear of compelled disclosure.
Quoting Wigmore, the court said that the reason for the privilege
is to "'secure the client's freedom of mind. .

.

. It is designed to

influence him when he may be hesitating between the positive action of disclosure and the inaction of secrecy.' "
B.

The Public Records Act

The Public Records Act states in relevant part that "[i]t is the
policy of this state that all state, county, and municipal records
shall at all times be open for a personal inspection by any person."' 10 Public records are defined as "all documents, papers, letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings or
other material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made
or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the
transaction of official business by any agency."" Public documents
may be inspected and examined "by any person desiring to do so,
at any reasonable time, under reasonable conditions, and under supervision by the custodian of the public record or his designee."12
The Public Records Act also contains a list of exceptions to the
Act.1" It states that "[a]ll public records which are presently provided by law to be confidential or which are prohibited from being
inspected by the public, whether by general or special law, are exempt from the provisions of subsection (1).'
The Public Records Act was the first of Florida's so-called "open
government laws." It became law in 1909. Its purpose, like the
Sunshine Act that was subsequently enacted, was to allow greater
public involvement in the government decisionmaking process by
opening up records to public scrutiny. As Judge Kaney explained
in Browning v. Walton, "[t]he purpose of this Statute was to open
7. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
8. 297 So. 2d 871, 871-72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
9. Id. at 872 (quoting 8 J. WIGMoRE,EVIDENCE § 2306 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).
10. FLA. STAT. § 119.01(1) (1983).
11. Id. § 119.011(1).
12. Id. § 119.07(1)(a) (Supp. 1984).
13. Id. § 119.07(3)(a)-(p).
14. Id. § 119.07(3)(a).

392

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:389

the records so the citizens could discover what their government
5
was doing.'

1

C. The Government in the Sunshine Law
Florida's other open government law is the Government in the
Sunshine Law. It provides in relevant part:
All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or
authority or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal
corporation, or political subdivision, except as otherwise provided

in the Constitution, at which official acts are to be taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times, and
no resolution, rule, or formal action shall be considered binding
except as taken or made at such meeting."0
This law was enacted in 1967. Two years later, in the case of

Board of Public Instruction v. Doran,17 Justice Adkins explained
the rationale behind the law:
The right of the public to be present and to be heard during all
phases of enactments by boards and commissions is a source of
strength in our country. During past years tendencies toward secrecy in public affairs have been the subject of extensive criticism.
Terms such as managed news, secret meetings, closed records, executive sessions, and study sessions have become synonymous
with "hanky panky" in the minds of public-spirited citizens. One
purpose of the Sunshine Law was to maintain the faith of the
public in governmental agencies.' 8

D. Legislative Reaction to Friction Created by the Statutes
It is obvious that the policies represented by these laws are in
conflict. If government entities are permitted to communicate
secretly with their attorneys pursuant to an attorney-client privilege, then the public will be denied access to some public meetings
and records. On the other hand, if the public is permitted access to
communications between government entities and their attorneys
pursuant to the open government laws, then government entities
15. 351 So. 2d 380, 381 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
16. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(l) (1983).
17. 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
18. Id. at 699.
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will be denied the benefit of confidential legal advice.
The legislature has failed to effectively deal with the conflict
that was created and has been unable to enact any statute that
would unambiguously resolve the controversy. Since 1977, there
have been several unsuccessful attempts to pass legislation that
would resolve the issue by granting more protection to the attorney-client relationships of government entities. 9 The legislature
came close to successfully resolving the conflict in 1977, when it
passed House Bill 1107. The bill would have created a limited exception to the Sunshine Law for attorney-client communications
by permitting public bodies involved in litigation to meet secretly
with their attorney to discuss future action in the litigation. However, the bill was vetoed by Governor Reubin Askew on June 29,
1977.20

This legislative inaction has made resolution of the conflict even
more complicated. Parties on both sides of the issue point to the
unwillingness of the legislature to enact a statute and argue that
the inaction supports their claims. Parties favoring a liberal interpretation of the open government laws claim that the failure to
pass legislation proves the legislature does not intend to create an
attorney-client privilege exception to the open government laws."
Advocates of the privilege respond that the inaction indicates
merely that the legislature knows that no action is necessary because the Evidence Code already provides such an exception.2 2
A related issue, whether Florida's open government laws preclude a claim of work product privilege by attorneys working for
the state, has recently been resolved by the legislature. Work product is material prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation. It can include memoranda, statements of witnesses, mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attor19. A list of bills which have failed to pass the legislature since 1977 includes: Fla. HB
687 (1982) (would have created attorney-client privilege exception to Public Records Act);
Fla. HB 785 (1981) (would have required parties engaged in litigation with public agencies
to waive their attorney work product privilege as a consequence of a Public Records Act
request); Fla. HB 1180, Fla. SB 926, and Fla. SB 1087 (1980) (would have created attorneyclient privilege exemption from Public Records Act); Fla. HB 1617 (1979) (would have prevented Public Records Act from being used to expand scope of discovery). In 1983, the
legislature rejected a proposal made by the Florida League of Cities to create an exception
for attorney-client communications.

20.

FLA.

H.R.

JOUR

2 (Spec. Sess. Dec. 13, 1977).

21. Respondent's Answer Brief at 35-38, City of North Miami v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 468 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1985).
22. Petitioner's Initial Brief at 29, City of North Miami v. Miami Herald Publishing Co.,
468 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1985).
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ney.2 3 The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide for a limited
privilege for work product. The rules protect certain documents
prepared by attorneys regardless of whether the documents are related to an attorney's confidential communcations with a client.2 4
But documents prepared by attorneys working for state agencies
could also be considered public records and could be subject to the
disclosure requirements of chapter 119. In 1984, the legislature resolved this conflict by creating a narrowly drawn exception to the
Public Records Act for certain work product prepared by an attorney working for a state agency. The newly enacted subsection
provides:
A public record which was prepared by an agency attorney, including an attorney employed or retained by the agency or employed or retained by another public officer or agency to protect
or represent the interests of the agency having custody of the record, or prepared at the attorney's express direction, which reflects
a mental impression, conclusion, litigation strategy, or legal theory of the attorney or the agency, and which was prepared in anticipation of imminent civil or criminal litigation or adversarial
administrative proceedings, is exempt from the [disclosure requirements of the Public Records Act] until the conclusion of the
litigation or adversarial administrative proceedings.2 5
While this legislation resolves the work product issue, it is not dispositive of the issue of the attorney-client privilege. Instead, it
merely provides more fuel for parties arguing both sides of the attorney-client issue. For example, rules of statutory construction,
such as the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, may be
used to support the contention that the legislature did not intend
to create an attorney-client privilege exception to the Public
Records Act. Under that rule, when the legislature creates specific
exceptions to the statute it can be inferred that if the legislature
had intended to establish other exceptions it would have done so
clearly and unequivocably. 26 Conversely, it can be argued that the
statutory enactment of the Evidence Code itself provided a clear
and unequivocal exception for the attorney-client privilege.
23.
24.
25.
26.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).

FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(2).
FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(o) (Supp.

1984).
Florida Legal Servs. v. State, 381 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
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III.

DEFINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LAWS: THE

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE COURTS AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Given the aforementioned conflict and legislative ambiguity, it is
not surprising that until the recent Florida Supreme Court decisions, the courts have had difficulty in attempting to reconcile the
statutes. This Part discusses the cases that have come before the
courts dealing with this issue and examines the attempts by the
courts and the Florida Attorney General to define the relationship
between open government and the attorney-client privilege.
A.

Cases Interpreting the Sunshine Act

The language of the Government in the Sunshine Act is very
broad: "All meetings. . . except as otherwise provided in the Constitution. . . are declared to be public meetings open to the public
at all times ....",27 The legislature has rarely provided for exemp-

tions from the Sunshine Act. The policy of favoring open meetings
in most circumstances was reaffirmed by the 1984 legislature when
it amended the Public Records Act. While the legislature revisited
old exceptions in subsection 3 of the Act and even created a new
work product exemption, it expressly provided that "[n]othing in
this subsection shall be interpreted as providing an exemption
from or exception to [the Sunshine Act]. ' ' 28 Similarly, the courts

have held that because the Sunshine Act was enacted for the public benefit, it should be broadly interpreted in a way that would be
most favorable to the public.29
Consequently, it was not surprising when the Florida Supreme
Court held that the attorney client privilege does not create an exception to the Sunshine Act in the recent case of Neu v. Miami
Herald Publishing Co.3 0 In fact, this conclusion seemed inevitable
in light of the cases that were decided before Neu.
In one of the first cases interpreting the Sunshine Act, Board of
Public Instruction v. Doran,s1 the Florida Supreme Court indicated just how broadly the statute was to be construed when it
stated: "The obvious intent [of the legislature] was to cover any
gathering of the members [of a public body] where the members
deal with some matter on which foreseeable action will be taken by
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

FLA. STAT. § 286.011(l) (1983).

Ch.84-298, § 5, 1984 Fla. Laws 1398, 1400-03.
Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288, 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).
462 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1985).
224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
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the [public body]. ' 32 In Doran, the Broward County School Board
had established a pattern of meeting informally, in private, in order to discuss three subject areas which they considered too sensitive to make public. The subjects discussed privately were matters
involving possible castigation or suspension of personnel, acquisition of or sale of real estate, and matters about which the board
wanted to confer with attorneys. The board would discuss these
matters privately but would not make any decision except at meetings held "in the sunshine. '33 A citizen brought suit to enjoin the
private meetings. The board claimed that since the actual decisions were made at public meetings, no violation of the Sunshine
Act had occurred. The board also claimed that there were valid
policy reasons for not discussing such matters in public.
The Florida Supreme Court disagreed and held that the public
could not be excluded from the meetings. In an opinion strongly
supportive of the goals of open government, Justice Adkins wrote:
"Regardless of their good intentions, these specified boards and
commissions, through devious ways, should not be allowed to deprive the public of this inalienable right to be present and to be
heard at all deliberations wherein decisions affecting the public are
being made. ' 34 Responding to the complaints of the board about
the impracticability and unfairness of requiring all meetings to be
held in the sunshine, Adkins advised that such "causes of complaint, if deserving, are matters for the Legislature, not the
36
courts. ,
The Doran holding undermined a decision made earlier by the
Second District Court of Appeal, Times Publishing Co. v. Williams.3 6 In that case, the Times Publishing Company sought an injunction to prevent the Pinellas County School Board from holding
secret meetings. 7 The Pinellas Board, like the Broward County
School Board, claimed that secret meetings were permitted, notwithstanding the Sunshine Law, when the meetings were held to
discuss school personnel or to consult with attorneys. The circuit
court dismissed the suit, but the district court reversed. Writing
for the court, Chief Judge Liles interpreted the Sunshine Act liberally and said that the legislature obviously intended to permit the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 698.
Id. at 697.
Id. at 699.
Id. at 700.
222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969).
Id. at 472.
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public to attend all meetings. But, in dicta, the court did leave
open one narrow exception to the Act 8 That exception was for
attorney communication "where public consultation with its attorney regarding pending or impending litigation would force him to
violate the Canons of Ethics as promulgated by the Supreme
Court." 9 Notably, the Florida Supreme Court did not recognize
such an exception in Doran.
Doran's broad interpretation of the Sunshine Law was reaffirmed in City of Miami Beach v. Berns.'0 The issue before the
supreme court in Berns was whether the Sunshine Act had superseded an earlier open meeting statute that had only applied to municipal councils when they were assembled in a formal session attended by a quorum. 4 1 The court in Berns held that the statute
was indeed superseded by the Sunshine Act and that the Act applied both to formal and informal meetings of public bodies. Part
of the court's rationale was that it had previously construed the
Sunshine Act to prohibit closed meetings since the Williams decision in 1969. In Williams, the court had noted that if the legislature disagreed with the expansive interpretation then it could
change the law either by amendment or supplementary legislation.42 Because the legislature had not amended the statute, Justice Adkins concluded, it would be presumed that the legislature's
3
intent was to allow no exceptions to the Act.'
In addition to affirming the supreme court's broad interpretation
of the Sunshine Act, the Berns decision illustrated that the court
did not intend to adopt an exception for attorney-client communications, even one as narrow as that permitted in Williams. The
Attorney General's office notes that prior to the issuance of the
Berns decision, a different opinion had been prepared by the supreme court. The earlier opinion appeared to approve the Williams exception, but when that was pointed out to the court, the
original opinion was withdrawn."
In light of these opinions, and particularly in light of the statutory language which states that exceptions shall only be made as
provided by the Florida Constitution, the effect of the attorney38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 474.
Id. at 476-77.
245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971).
Id. at 39; see Turk v. Richard, 47 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1950).
Williams, 222 So. 2d at 474.
Berns, 245 So. 2d at 41.

44. See

FLORIDA OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS MANUAL

19 (1984 ed.).
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client privilege on the Sunshine Law would appear to be a simple
issue. The supreme court had said there should be no judicial exceptions. The statute provided that exceptions were to be made
only by the constitution; therefore, the Evidence Code should not
create an exception to the Sunshine Law. But such simplicity was
not the case. Despite the statutory and judicial language, the issue
became more complicated as a result of limited statutory and judi45
cial exceptions to the Sunshine Law.
The 1984 Florida Open Government Laws Manual, published
by the Attorney General's office, listed ten exceptions to the Sunshine Act that were expressly stated in other parts of the Florida
Statutes. 46 The courts have not been called upon to decide whether
such statutory exceptions are proper, or whether the Act can be
excepted only by the constitution. But they have indirectly answered that question in the affirmative by allowing statutory and,
in certain cases, even judicially-created exemptions.
In Bassett v. Braddock, 7 the supreme court held that labor
negotiators could meet privately with the members of a school
board to consult about their negotiations. Reasoning that the constitution provides public employees the right to collective bargaining, 48 the court concluded that this right would be meaningless
without the ability to discuss negotiations in private. 9 The significance of Bassett is its recognition that constitutional exceptions to
the Sunshine Act need not be express, but may be judicially implied when a constitutional provision is found to conflict with the
Act. The court may have been reaching for a constitutional basis
for the exception because of its concern about the fairness of the
negotiation process. Writing for the court, Justice Deckle
explained:
45. For a discussion of exceptions to both the Sunshine Act and the Public Records Act,
see Comment, infra note 133.
46. The exceptions listed are FLA. STAT. § 106.25(5) (1983) (exempting certain documents
and reports filed with the Division of Elections); id. §§ 110.201(4), 447.605(1) (exempting
certain discussions relating to collective bargaining); id. § 112.324(1) (exempting certain proceedings of the Ethics Commission); id. § 230.23(4)(m)(4) (exempting certain hearings regarding student placement); id. § 240.209(2) (exempting activities of the search committee
for selection of Chancellor of the State University System); id. §§ 395.010(3), 395.0115(3)
(exempting certain proceedings of a probable cause panel). For a complete list of exceptions
to the open government laws, see FLORIDA OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS MANUAL 69-105 (1984
ed.).
47. 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
48.

FLA. CONST. art. I,

§

6.

49. Bassett, 262 So. 2d at 426.
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The public's representatives must be afforded at least an equal
position with that enjoyed by those with whom they deal. The
public should not suffer a handicap at the expense of a purist
view of open public meetings, so long as the ultimate debate and
decisions are public and the "official acts" and "formal action"
specified by the statute are taken in open "public meetings." 50
Justice Adkins' well-reasoned dissent raises doubts about the validity of claims that the exception was based upon a provision of
the constitution.5 1 In any case, whether the justification was valid
seems largely irrelevant in light of the fact that a statutory exception to the Sunshine Act was permitted in Tribune Co. v. School
Board of Hillsborough County.5"
The law in question in Tribune Co. was chapter 69-1146, section
5, a special law enacted for the Hillsborough School Board dealing
with the board's disciplinary proceedings. The law allowed the individual teacher undergoing disciplinary review to decide if his or
her hearing would be public or private. The Tampa Tribune,
which had been barred from such a hearing, claimed that the law
was an invalid delegation of statutory authority because it permitted the individual teacher to decide whether the Sunshine Act
would apply. Disagreeing with the Tribune, the supreme court held
that the law was valid and permitted the statutory exemption to
the Sunshine Act.53 Once again, Justice Adkins dissented, suggesting that the right of the public to know might eventually become a constitutional right.5 4
Thus the court has permitted express statutory exemptions for
the Sunshine Act. But until Neu it had not determined the effect
of a subsequent statute, such as the Evidence Code, which implicitly conflicts with the Sunshine Law but does not expressly constitute an exception.
The First District Court of Appeal faced that issue but was able
to avoid a decision in Mitchell v. School Board of Leon County.5 5
Ruth Mitchell was a former teacher whose position had been eliminated as a result of a school board reorganization plan. Mitchell
brought suit, claiming the board had acted improperly in abolishing her position. Seeking to discover information that was used in
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 427.
Id. at 429 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
367 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1979).
Id. at 629.
Id. (Adkins, J., dissenting).
335 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
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formulating the reorganization plan, Mitchell deposed school officials to ascertain the substance of conversations they had had with
the school board's attorneys. The school board claimed that the
conversations were privileged communications. Mitchell claimed
that they were subject to disclosure pursuant to the Sunshine
Act. 6
The district court was able to avoid deciding whether the attorney-client privilege created an exception to the Sunshine Act, because the Act itself does not apply in this situation. The court held
that the Act required a meeting of two or more public officials.
Since no such meeting had occurred, the Act did not apply.57 The
court said it would "await a case involving appropriate facts"
before deciding the attorney-client issue. 58 But the court did hint
at what its conclusion might be when it stated: "[The] law was
never intended to become a millstone around the neck of the public's representatives when being sued by a private party, nor should
it be construed to discourage representatives of the people from
seeking legal counsel." 59
The Third District Court of Appeal did decide that issue in the
case that was eventually decided by the supreme court, State ex
rel. Reno v. Neu.60 The district court held that the privilege did
not create an exception to the Sunshine Act. The supreme court
affirmed that decision.
The Neu case arose when the members of the city council of the
City of North Miami planned a meeting with their attorney. The
council planned to hold the meeting in private so that the council
members could discuss pending litigation and decide on settlement
options. The Miami Herald claimed that such a private meeting
was a violation of the Government in the Sunshine Act. The Herald and State Attorney Janet Reno sought a declaratory judgment
from the circuit court that the meeting should be subject to the
requirements of the Sunshine Act. 1
The trial court held that the Sunshine Act did not apply and
that the meeting could be held in private.2 On appeal, the Third
District reversed the trial court and held that the proposed private
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 355.
Id. at 356.
Id.
Id. at 355.
434 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (per curiam), afl'd, 462 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1985).
Neu, 434 So. 2d at 1035.
Id.
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meeting would have been in violation of the Sunshine Act.6 3 The
district court relied upon several opinions of the Florida Supreme
Court in reaching its decision. It cited both Board of Public Instruction v. Doran6 4 and City of Miami Beach v. Berns6" for the
proposition that a city council cannot exclude the public from
meetings, even when pending litigation is scheduled to be
discussed. 6
Both Doran and Berns were decided before the effective date of
the Florida Evidence Code. Nevertheless, the Third District's per
curiam decision reasoned that despite the fact that the Evidence
Code was now in effect, it would not affect the Herald case because
exceptions to the Sunshine Act could only be created by the state
constitution.67 The court recognized that the issue was of "obvious
continuing significance" and for that reason offered the supreme
court the opportunity to revisit the issue by certifying the question: "Whether the Sunshine Law applies to meetings between a
City Council and the City Attorney held for the purpose of discussing the settlement of pending litigation to which the city is a
party." 68 On appeal, the supreme court used the case to resolve
three issues related to the Sunshine Act. First, it held that a goverment entity could not create an intermediate category of meeting
in order to resolve the conflict between the Sunshine Act and the
attorney-client privilege. The North Miami city council had tried
to use such a procedure that would have permitted representatives
of the press and others to the meeting provided they pledged to
respect the confidentiality of the case discussed until the case
could be resolved. The supreme court found that this compromise
could not be permitted because "under the Sunshine Law, a meeting is either fully open or fully closed; there are no intermediate
categories."6 9
Second, the court found that the Third District had been incorrect when it suggested that exceptions to the Sunshine Law could
only be made by the constitution. This is not true because the legislature "may not bind the hands of future legislatures by prohibit63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1036.
224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971).
Neu, 434 So. 2d at 1035-36.
Id. at 1036.
Id.
Neu v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 462 So. 2d 821, 823 (Fla. 1985).
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'70
ing amendments to statutory law."
The court next held that the Evidence Code does not create an
exception to the Sunshine Act. In reaching its conclusion, the court
relied primarily upon legislative history which indicated that the
legislature did not intend to create such an exception. In particular, the court noted that the 1977 legislature did attempt to enact a
bill that would have permitted governmental bodies to meet privately with their attorneys to discuss pending litigation. This bill
successfully passed the legislature, but was vetoed by Governor
Reubin Askew. A logical conclusion that could be drawn from this
attempted enactment is that the legislature did want to create an
exception for attorney-client communications. However, the court
ignored this inference and instead found that the significance of
the Act is that "it clearly indicates that the legislature . . . did not
intend by its earlier enactment of [the attorney-client privilege] to
create an exception to the Sunshine Law for attorney/client meetings. If it had so intended, HB 1107 would have been a pointless
act."'" In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected several other
arguments made by the petitioners. The petitioners had urged that
the court's previous opinion in Bassett v. Braddock7 2 permitted
private meetings to discuss litigation. While admitting that some
of the language in Bassett might be considered broad enough to
support such an assertion, the decision was actually restricted to
one exception based in the constitution-the right of public employees to bargain collectively. 73 The court also rejected an argument that the Sunshine Act is in conflict with the requirement of
confidentiality under the Code of Professional Responsibility. This
attorney-client privilege actually belongs to the client and, as the
court explained, the legislature waived the privilege by enacting
the Sunshine Act.74 The petitioner's arguments based upon due
process rights to consult with an attorney were also rejected because the United States Supreme Court had previously rejected
75
such claims.
Finally, the petitioner argued that the court's previous decisions
giving a broad interpretation to the Sunshine Act should be reversed because they "effectively strangled the political process in

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
Neu, 462 So. 2d at 824.
Id.
Willimas v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933).
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Florida '7' and provided an unfair advantage to private litigants.
The court responded to this argument as it had always done by
reminding the petitioner that" 'this argument should be addressed
to the legislature.'
Joining in the majority opinion were Chief
Justice Boyd and Justices Adkins, Ehrlich, and Shaw. But perhaps
of equal significance to the ultimate effect of the opinion were a
concurrence and a dissent, each by two justices.
In a special concurrence written by Justice Overton in which
Justice Ehrlich joined, Justice Overton emphasized that the opinion only applied to "meetings of boards, commissions . . .where
official acts are taken. '7 8 Citing the court's previous decisions in
Wood v. Marston79 and Occidental Chemical Co. v. Mayo,80 the
justices noted that neither the Sunshine Law nor the court's opinion would apply to the executive officers of governmental entities.
Thus, a government executive, such as a governor or city manager,
could meet with an attorney in private to discuss the legal affairs
of the public entity in confidence without violating the Sunshine
Law.81
Justice McDonald dissented and was joined by Justice Alderman. They stated that there were "no public policy reasons to extend the Sunshine Law to govern communications between a public body and its attorneys concerning litigation in which the public
body is a party. '8' Thus they concluded that the attorney-client
privilege did create an exception to the Sunshine Act because "it
was [not] the original intent of the legislature to abrogate the at83
torney-client confidentiality rule."1
",77

B.

Cases Interpreting the Public Records Act

The language of the Public Records Act is also very broad:
"[A]ll state, county, and municipal records shall at all times be
open for a personal inspection by any person."8 4 If this were the
only language of the statute, there would be no question that the
attorney-client privilege could not be an exception to the Act.
76.
77.
1979)).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Neu, 462 So. 2d at 825.
Id. at 826 (quoting Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420, 424 (Fla.
Neu, 462 So. 2d at 826.
442 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1983).
351 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1977).
Neu, 462 So. 2d at 826.
Id.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 119.01(1) (1983) (emphasis added).
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However, the legislature and the courts have recognized that "the
right to know must occasionally be circumscribed when the potential damages far outweigh the possible benefits."8 5 For this reason,
when the legislature enacted chapter 119, it included a list of ex86
ceptions to the law.
One of the exceptions which is found within the Public Records
Act itself is that "[alll public records which are presently provided
by law to be confidential or which are prohibited from being inspected by the public" are exempt from the requirements of disclosure.8 7 Proponents of an attorney-client privilege exception to
the Public Records Act relied upon that language to claim that the
legislature has already created such an exception by its enactment
of the Evidence Code. But because the attorney-client privilege is
not expressly included in the list of Public Records Act exceptions,
judicial interpretation of the statute was necessary.
Despite the fact that the most recent case decided by the Florida
Supreme Court held that the evidence code did not create an attorney-client exception to the Public Records Act, earlier lower
court interpretation did imply that such an exception existed. The
line of cases that seemed to support an exception began before
1979 when, for public policy reasons, the courts occasionally enlarged the list of exceptions contained in the Public Records Act.
The justification for such judicial exceptions was that the law had
previously exempted all public records "deemed by law" to be confidential or prohibited from inspection. Courts interpreted this
"deemed by law" language to mean that exceptions could be created by the courts as well as by statute.
The Second District Court of Appeal created just such an exception in Wisher v. News-Press Publishing Co. 9 In that case, the
85. Wisher v. News-Press Publishing Co., 310 So. 2d 345, 348 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975),
quashed and remanded, 345 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1977).
86. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(a)-(n) (1983).
87. Id. § 119.07(3)(a).
88. See id. § 119.07(2)(a) (1973).
89. 310 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), quashed and remanded, 345 So. 2d 646 (Fla.
1977). The supreme court avoided the issue of whether an exception to the Public Records
Act should be created for confidential records such as personnel files. Instead, it held that
the specific document which the newspaper sought to have disclosed-the warning of possible termination-could not be exempt from the Public Records Act because it was not confidential. The court noted that the warning had not been provided by a private source who
had been promised confidentiality but was authored by a public body at an open public
meeting. Because the warning was not confidential, the court held there was no need to
reach the issue of whether confidential documents should be exempted from open government laws. Id. at 647.
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local newspaper, the Fort Myers News-Press, sought disclosure of
the personnel files of all the department heads employed by Lee
County. The News-Press wanted to examine the records to discover the name of the department head who had been reprimanded by the Lee County Board of County Commissioners. The
employee had been discussed, but not named, at a commission
meeting. The newspaper knew that it would be able to identify the
employee if permitted to examine the personnel files, because the
commissioners had agreed to place a warning in the employee's
file.90
Lee County refused to allow examination of the personnel
records, and the News-Press obtained a writ of mandamus ordering disclosure of the records.9 1 On appeal, the district court conceded that the personnel files were public records and were not
expressly exempted from disclosure by the statute.9 2 However, the
court relied upon the "deemed by law" language in the statute to
hold that courts could also create exemptions as a matter of public
policy.93 After reviewing the private and confidential nature of personnel records, the court held that "public disclosure of the personnel files of governmental employees could result in irreparable
harm to the public interest and would be against the public
policy."9 4
During the 1975 legislative session, immediately after the Wisher
decision, the Public Records Act was amended. The phrase
"deemed by law" that the Wisher court had relied upon to create a
judicial exception was changed to "provided by law.""
The significance of that amendment was first noted by the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in State ex rel. Veale v. City of
Boca Raton.9 6 In Veale, the City of Boca Raton directed its assistant city attorney to investigate irregularities in the city's building
department. The Boca Raton News sought disclosure of the report
that was made as a result of those investigations. The city, relying
upon the attorney-client privilege and the Wisher decision, refused
90. Wisher, 310 So. 2d at 346.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 347.
93. Id. at 349.
94. Id. at 348.
95. Ch. 75-225, § 4, 1975 Fla. Laws 637, 638-39 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
119.07(3)(a) (1983)).
96. 353 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 360 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1978). The
lower court opinion was authored by Judge Schwartz, Chief Judge of the Third District,
sitting by designation.
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to make the report public. Max Veale, managing editor of the Boca
Raton News, petitioned for a writ of mandamus, but the petition
was dismissed by the trial court."
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the
report was a public record subject to chapter 119 disclosure requirements. Writing for the court, Judge Schwartz said that the
1975 amendment to the Public Records Act, which changed the
words "deemed by law" to "provided by law," precluded any judicial exceptions to chapter 119. The court reasoned that the phrase
"deemed by law" included opinions and decisions of courts, but
that "provided by law" could only mean provided by statute. 8
Judge Schwartz noted that this conclusion was inevitable in light
of the Florida Supreme Court's handling of the Wisher case. Jurisdiction in Wisher was based upon its conflict with the supreme
court's earlier decision in the case of State ex rel. Cummer v.
Pace.99 Pace specifically held that the creation of nonstatutory exceptions was beyond the purview of the courts.100 By quashing and
remanding Wisher, the Florida Supreme Court implicitly reaffirmed the Pace decision, thus leaving the Veale court with little
choice other than to arrive at a similar conclusion. 1°
Chief Judge Alderman of the Fourth District Court of Appeal
concurred with Judge Schwartz on the Veale opinion. Two years
later, Alderman, by then a Florida Supreme Court justice, relied
upon the Veale rationale when the supreme court decided the case
of Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co. °2
The Wait case was the first time that the Florida Supreme Court
dealt with the conflict between open government laws and the attorney-client privilege. The case arose out of litigation before the
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission between the City of
New Smyrna Beach (New Smyrna) and Florida Power and Light
Company (FPL). The litigation concerned the construction and
operation of FPL's nuclear power plants.
During pretrial discovery, FPL sought to inspect New Smyrna's
records of the planning, operation, and maintenance of the city's
electrical system. New Smyrna claimed that in order to remove any
information that was confidential, its attorney would have to re97. Id. at 1195.
98. Id. at 1196.
99. 159 So. 679 (Fla. 1935).
100. Id. at 681.
101. Veale, 353 So. 2d at 1197.
102. 372 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979).
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view all the documents before FPL could inspect them. For this
reason, New Smyrna denied FPL the right to inspect the records.
FPL, relying upon the Public Records Act, claimed that it had a
right to inspect all of New Symrna's documents. FPL sought a writ
of mandamus in the circuit court to obtain access to the documents. 10 3 The circuit court granted the writ; the First District
Court of Appeal affirmed. 0 4
New Smyrna appealed, but the Florida Supreme Court held that
FPL had the right to inspect the documents. 10 5 The supreme court
held that when the legislature enacted the Public Records Act, it
intended to exempt from disclosure only those public records
which had been made confidential by statutory law. Documents
which were confidential in nature as a result of judicial construction, such as the judicially created attorney-client privilege, were
not exempt from disclosure. 0 6 Florida's statutory attorney-client
privilege, contained in the Evidence Code, had not yet taken effect.
The supreme court came to its decision after considering the history of the Public Records Act and its exceptions. The court noted
that, as first enacted, the law exempted public records that were
"deemed by law" to be confidential, but that in 1975 the legislature had amended the statute to restrict the exceptions to only
those "provided by law." Writing for the court, Justice Alderman
noted that this change had occurred after Wisher. The court in
Wisher, relying upon the "deemed by law" language, held that
nonstatutory public policy considerations could be used to restrict
access to documents that would otherwise be open to inspection
under the Public Records Act. 10 Given the prompt change in the
statute after the Wisher decision, the supreme court agreed with
the reasoning in Veale that "'[i]t seems obvious . . . that the very
purpose of the statutory amendment was specifically to overrule
the Second District Wisher conclusion and preclude judicially created exceptions to the Act in question.' "o108
Therefore, the Wait court held that exceptions to the Public
Records Act could only be made by statute. However, Wait did not
finally resolve the question of the relationship between open government laws and the attorney-client privilege. The relevance of
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

422.
423.
422.
424.

(quoting Veale, 353 So. 2d at 1196).
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the Wait opinion appeared to be undermined by the Florida Evidence Code, which took effect after the decision was handed
down.1 0 9
The Wait decision was of limited applicability because it was
decided on the basis of the common law attorney-client privilege.
Justice Alderman's opinion seemed to suggest that a statutory
privilege might create an exception to the Public Records Act: "If
the common law privileges are to be included as exemptions, it is
up to the legislature, and not this Court, to amend the statute."" 0
This language, together with the court's holding that only public
records "made confidential by statutory law" are exempted from
the Public Records Act, led some courts to conclude in subsequent
cases that the attorney-client privilege in the Evidence Code created an exception to the Act.
The first reported opinion to hold that the statutory attorneyclient privilege created an exception to the Public Records Act was
City of Tampa v. Titan Southeast Construction Corp."' Titan
was a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the Public Records Act required the city of Tampa to disclose documents
that were attorney-client communications, or whether the Evidence Code exempted the communications from disclosure
requirements.
In a memorandum opinion by Judge Carr, the court noted that
Wait precluded exceptions to the Public Records Act that were
based on the common law attorney-client privilege. But Carr also
noted that shortly after the Wait decision the Evidence Code had
taken effect."' The Code had created a statutory attorney-client
privilege, and its definition of client included "any . . .organization or entity, either public or private, who consults a lawyer.""' 3
The court explained that "[t]he inclusion of public entities within
the definition of client suggests that the legislature intended to extend the lawyer-client privilege to municipal organizations, thereby
from disclosure pursuexempting their attorney-client documents
1 4
"
Act.
Records
Public
ant to the
The court admitted that the legislature did not create the exemption by specifically amending the Public Records Act, but the
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See C. EHRHARDT, supra note 1, § 502.4.
Wait, 372 So. 2d at 424.
535 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
Id. at 165.
FLA. STAT. § 90.502(l)(b) (1983).
Titan, 535 F. Supp. at 165.

1985]

ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS

court stated that the Florida Supreme Court had not required all
exemptions to be made in such a manner. " 5 Even more significant
to the district court was the fact that other laws had authorized
nondisclosure but were not made a part of chapter 119.116 The
court also noted that the legislature is presumed to know the law
when it enacts a statute. Accordingly, the federal court came to the
conclusion that, when the legislature enacted the Evidence Code, it
did intend to create an exception to the Public Records Act with7
out specifically amending chapter 119.111
In summing up its well-reasoned decision, the court stated:
[T]he Wait decision stands for the proposition that it is up to the
legislature to define, by statute, the privileges to which a public
entity is entitled. The legislature did just that when it passed the
Evidence Code and recognized "public" entities as "clients" that
have "a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other
person from disclosing" lawyer-client communications .... The
City of Tampa has chosen to exercise that privilege and, therefore, can withhold from Titan the lawyer-client communications
Titan has requested. " 8
Although no Florida appellate court expressly adopted the Titan
holding, there were five reported decisions that acknowledged the
holding. In those cases, the courts seemed to explicitly adopt the
Titan rationale, yet at the same time they attempted to avoid the
issue until the Florida Supreme Court had ruled on the question.
One example is Tober v. Sanchez," 9 decided four months after
Titan. In Tober, the attorney for potential claimants against the
Metropolitan Dade County Transit Agency (MTA) sought inspection of MTA's accident reports. Officials at MTA transferred the
reports to their attorneys and then claimed that they were exempted from the disclosure requirements of the Public Records
Act because of attorney-client and work product privileges. 12 0 On
the attorney-client issue, the court admitted that "the legislature
may have effectively amended the Public Records Act as contem115.
116.
117.

118.
119.
1983).
120.

Id. at 165 n.3.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 166.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1981)).
417 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), petition for review denied, 426 So. 2d 27 (Fla.
Id. at 1055.
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plated by the Wait opinion.' 121 However, the court did not have to
decide the issue because the documents sought were not attorneyclient communications and could not give rise to any claim of attorney-client privilege. Judge Nesbitt explained, "[W]e expressly
decline to venture into the area of statutory construction because
we otherwise determine that there simply is no attorney-client
22
privilege present in the instant case.'
The Third District Court of Appeal came closer to approving the
Titan rationale in Donner v. Edelstein. 23 The trial court in Donner had ordered dismissal of a mandamus petition that sought discovery relating to pending litigation. Petitioner claimed a right to
inspect records pursuant to the Public Records Act. The district
court held that the trial court's order was a "bare bones order of
dismissal, which recite[d] only that the relators have not made out
a prima facie case.' 1 24 Therefore, the case was remanded with directions to order respondents to show cause why the order should
not be granted.1 25 Because the trial court did not state grounds for
dismissal, the district court said it would "leave for another day"
the question of whether the Evidence Code created an exception to

chapter

119.126

On remand, the trial court held that the documents did not have
to be disclosed because the attorney-client privilege did create an
exception to the disclosure requirements. When the case was appealed for the second time, the Third District Court of Appeal
seemed to tacitly accept such a holding.'2 7 Although the case was
remanded to the trial court again, it was remanded only with instructions to examine in camera the documents being withheld
from disclosure under the claim of privilege. The district court's
main concern seemed to be the fact that the trial court should not
have permitted the city to decide unilaterally which documents
28
were covered by the privilege.
The Third District again implied its acceptance of an attorneyclient privilege exception in Parsons & Whittemore, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County.'2 9 The trial court in Parsons had ordered
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
415 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (per curiam).
Id. at 831.
Id.
Id.
Donner v. Edelstein, 423 So. 2d 367, 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (per curiam).
Id.
429 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (per curiam).
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inspection of documents during discovery prior to a lawsuit against
Dade County. The county claimed a privilege, and the district
court remanded to the trial court with directions to examine the
documents in camera to determine which, if any, were actually
work product rather than attorney-client documents. Because the
work product exception to the Public Records Act had not yet
been enacted, documents that were work product would be required to be disclosed. However, the court's reference to its decision in Donner could imply that attorney-client privilege documents were exempt from disclosure.13 0
Similar implicit approvals of the attorney-client privilege exception to the Public Records Act occurred in City of Williston v.
Roadlander,'3 ' Hillsborough County Aviation Authority v. Azzarelli Construction Co.,1 32 and Aldredge v. Turlington.133
By 1984, although Titan remained the only reported decision
that expressly recognized an attorney-client privilege exception,
there seemed to be a clear trend toward acceptance of such an exemption from the Act. But in February 1984, despite earlier opinions from the Third District that seemed to accept the exemption,
that court rejected claims of an attorney-client exemption in
3
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. City of North Miami.1'
In the Miami Herald case, the Herald sought disclosure of several City of North Miami litigation files pursuant to the Public
Records Act. The city relied upon the attorney-client privilege to
claim that the documents did not have to be disclosed. The trial
court denied the Herald's petition and refused to force disclosure.
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal remanded for an in
camera inspection of the documents to determine which records, if
any, were protected, and which records must be disclosed.13 5 Following an in camera inspection, the trial court found that certain
written communications between the members of the North Miami
City Council and the city attorney were exempt from disclosure
because they qualified under the attorney-client privilege. The
130. Id. at 345.
131. 425 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
132. 436 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
133. 378 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st DCA) (per curiam), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1189 (Fla.
1980). Aldredge is noted in Comment, Exceptions to the Sunshine Law and the Public
Records Law: Have They Impaired Open Government in Florida?,8 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 265,
290 (1980).
134. 452 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
135. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. City of North Miami, 420 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA
1982) (per curiam).
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Miami Herald again appealed, and the Third District Court of Appeal reversed and held that the documents were not exempt from
the Public Records Act. 3
The district court relied upon Wait v. Florida Power & Light
Co. and held that only public records provided by statute to be
confidential or expressly excepted by general or special law were
exempt from the disclosure requirements of the Public Records
Act. 137 Judge Jorgenson, writing for the court, admitted that the
Evidence Code did allow a client the privilege of refusing to disclose confidential communications between lawyer and client, but
he stated that the Code was limited in its applicability. The Evidence Code, he reasoned, was only applicable to the admissibility
of evidence and burdens of proof at hearings and trials. Therefore,
there was no indication that the legislature intended to abrogate
the disclosure requirements of the Public Records Act when it enacted the Evidence Code.1 38
The court admitted that its holding had the effect of placing
governmental entities at a disadvantage when compared to private
persons. Nevertheless, the court concluded that if there was to be
an exemption from the Public Records Act based on the attorneyclient privilege, then it was the legislature that must enact such an
exception. Because of the continuing significance of the question,
the court decided to give the supreme court the opportunity to revisit the issue. The district court certified the following question to
the supreme court: "Does the lawyer-client privilege section of the
Florida Evidence Code exempt from the disclosure requirements of
the Public Records Act written communications between a lawyer
and his public-entity client?"' 139
The district court holding was affirmed by the Florida Supreme
Court in City of North Miami v. Miami Herald Publishing Co.'4 0
In its opinion, the court states that there is "no question that the
written communications at issue are public records subject to
chapter 119."''1 The court then commented upon two of the arguments raised by the petitioners. Regarding the assertion that
"their constitutional rights of due process, effective assistance of
counsel, freedom of speech, and [the supreme court's] exclusive ju136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

City of North Miami, 452 So. 2d at 572.
Id. at 573.
Id.
Id. at 574.
468 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1985).
Id. at 219.
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risdiction over The Florida Bar prohibit public disclosure," the
court relied upon the rationale used in rejecting those same arguments in Neu. That reasoning was summarized with this somewhat
circular explanation:
The legislature has the constitutional power to regulate disclosure
of public records of the state and its political subdivisions and
has done so through chapter 119. The communications (public
records) belong to the client (government entity), not the lawyer,
and the legislature, not this Court, regulates disclosure of public
records. 142
The court also rejected a related argument made by the City of
North Miami that the council members were constitutionally entitled, as individuals, to private communications with the city's attorney. The court labeled this argument fallacious and noted that
"[tihe city attorney furnishes legal assistance to council members
in their official capacity, not as individual citizens. '"143
Finally, the court rejected the petitioner's argument that the
statutory attorney-client privilege creates an exception to the Public Records Act. In rejecting that argument, the court relied on the
significance of the newly enacted work product exception to the
Public Records Act."4 Noting that courts should not assume that
the legislature acted pointlessly, the court stated:
If chapter 90 provided a permanent exemption for attorney/client
communications between government agencies and their attorneys, as petitioners urge, it would have been pointless for the legislature to enact a temporary [work product] exemption during
145
pendancy of litigation.
Thus, the supreme court concluded that because the legislature
created a work product exception to the Public Records Act, no
attorney-client privilege exception should be recognized. This explanation is remarkable in that it ignores the fact that work product is not necessarily material that would have been covered under
an attorney-client privilege exception. Work product is material
prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation. Although it
may include material discussed by attorney and client, it fre142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
145. City of North Miami, 468 So. 2d at 219.
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quently consists of material that the client is not at all involved in
preparing. Thus, it is possible that the legislature intended to create a work product exception to protect from disclosure material
that was not already protected by the attorney-client privilege. Yet
the supreme court ignored the distinction between work product
and attorney-client communications, and on this questionable basis held that the attorney-client privilege did not create an exception to the Public Records Act.
Justice McDonald, again joined by Justice Alderman, dissented
from the result in the City of North Miami case. In his dissent, he
reiterated his views in the Neu case and stated that the Evidence
Code did create an exception to the Public Records Act. In support
of his opinion, Justice McDonald noted that the Code expressly
designated communications between an attorney and client as
"confidential," and that the Public Records Act exempts records
presently provided by law to be "confidential."" 6
IV.

EFFECT OF THE RECENT CASES THAT HOLD THERE

Is No

EXCEPTION TO THE OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS

In reviewing the effect of the Neu and City of North Miami
opinions, there are two areas of inquiry which must be examined.
First, are these opinions likely to be the final pronouncements by
the Florida Supreme Court on the issue? Second, under these
holdings what options are available to public entity clients seeking
to consult with their attorney?
A.

Continuing Validity of Neu and City of North Miami

In view of the variety of opinions expressed by the justices on
these issues, it seems likely that future cases will result in at least
a fine tuning of the rules that will be applied in cases dealing with
the conflict between open government laws and the attorney-client
privilege.
For example, regarding the Sunshine Law: two justices dissented
from the opinion 147 and two justices specially concurred to say that
communications between a governmental executive and an attorney could be confidential. In light of this fact, it is likely that the
majority of the court would approve of confidential communications by a governmental executive.
146. Id. at 220.
147. One of the dissenters, Justice Alderman, has recently resigned from the court. Obviously, this too could have an effect on the outcome of future cases.
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However, no such special concurrence was included in the Public
Records Act case. Therefore, the questions of whether "public
records" could be prepared exclusively by a governmental executive in order to avoid disclosure requirements of the Public
Records Act is much more speculative. But in light of the many
exemptions already available under the Act, it is likely that such a
question would never arise.
B.

Options Available to Governmental Entity Clients

Only time will reveal what the lasting impact of the Neu and
City of North Miami decisions will be. But at the present time,
those cases are the law and they appear to provide three options to
governmental entity clients who seek to consult with their
attorneys.
The first option is to continue to hold meetings with attorneys
"in the sunshine." It is likely that in many cases, this is the option
that will be followed. In most circumstances, governmental entities
find that it is perfectly acceptable to receive advice from their attorneys in public. Only in rare instances, such as in discussions of
pending litigation and particularly settlement negotiations, do governmental entities seek privacy in their discussions with counsel.
In those circumstances, the governmental entity may choose the
second option which seems to be available. That option is to delegate authority to settle cases to an executive and let the executive
48
conduct the discussions in private.
The final option available to public entity clients is one that the
supreme court has repeatedly stated as the one option available to
litigators unhappy with the pronouncements of the court. That advice is to take the complaints to the legislature. Since there is now
a positive pronouncement by the courts that they do not intend to
construe the Evidence Code as providing an attorney-client exception to the open government laws, it appears that it is indeed the
time to take the complaints to the legislature.
V.

CONCLUSION

Florida's open government laws-the Public Records Act and
the Sunshine Law-promote the important public policy of openness in the state's decisionmaking process. But application of those
148. P. Townes, Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges For Public Entities 33-34
(April 15, 1985) (unpublished manuscript) (available in Florida State University College of
Law Library).
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laws interferes with another important policy-the right of public
entity clients to receive effective legal advice in confidence. The
legislature has enacted the attorney-client privilege section of the
Florida Evidence Code to promote that policy.
The open government laws and the attorney-client privilege do
not refer to each other, so a question arose about the relation between them. The supreme court has recently held that the privilege does not create an exception to the Sunshine Act or the Public
Records Act. As a result of these recent holdings, governmental entity clients must conduct discussions with their attorneys in the
sunshine and disclose all non-exempt public records. Governmental entities can choose to avoid the harsh consequences that can
occur when pending litigation is to be discussed by delegating authority to their executive officer, who will likely be permitted to
claim an attorney-client privilege. The only other option available
to governmental entities seeking to consult privately with atttorneys is to urge the legislature to change the law to permit such
confidential communications.

